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THE NATURAL RIGHTS-BASED
JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
James E. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION
On this panel, we are to consider questions such as "What form
should constitutional interpretation by courts take in light of our
aspirations to a good society?" For example, should courts engage in
"moral readings" of the Constitution by elaborating abstract moral
principles of liberty and equality or by making moral arguments about
fostering human goods or virtues? In his paper, Justifying the Natural
Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, Professor Michael
Moore defends a sophisticated and powerful version of a moral realist
or natural law answer to these questions.2 He confesses that, despite
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Fellow in Ethics,
Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, 1999-2000. I would like to
thank Sot Barber, Sandy Levinson, Linda McClain, Frank Michelman, Larry Sager,
and Ben Zipursky for helpful conversations concerning this article. Thanks also to
Fordham and to Harvard for generous financial support.
1. Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2087 (2001).
2. Moore is arguably the leading proponent of a moral realist or natural law
theory of constitutional interpretation among law professors. Sotirios A. Barber is
arguably the leading proponent of a theory similar to Moore's view among political
science professors. See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power
(1993); Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means (1984). Robert P.
George has developed a moral realist or natural law theory that is radically different
from Moore's and Barber's views both in its content and in its implications for a
theory of judicial review. See e.g., Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution,
and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 Fordham L Rev. (forthcoming
May 2001). In a forthcoming article, I criticize George's view. See James E. Fleming,
Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional Interpretation, 69
Fordham L. Rev. (May 2001). I should acknowledge and address an evident tension
between my critique of Moore's view here and my critique of George's view there.
Here, I criticize Moore for placing too much emphasis upon judicial enforcement of
natural rights to the exclusion of protection of natural rights outside the courts by
legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. There, I criticize George for rejecting
judicial enforcement of natural rights and leaving the protection of natural rights to
legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. I would reconcile my evidently
conflicting positions in the two papers by claiming that we need protection of natural
rights both in the courts (contra George) and outside the courts (contra Moore). Put
another way, my view lies between those of Moore and George: we need more
emphasis on protection of natural rights outside the courts than Moore countenances,




numerous criticisms, his views on the desirability of such a theory
have not changed at all over the past twenty years; here he seeks "to
provide a new reason for judges to adopt such a theory of
interpretation with regard to the United States Constitution."'
Likewise, I might confess that my basic criticisms of moral realist
theories of constitutional interpretation have not changed during the
same period;4 here I shall provide criticisms of Moore's new argument.
That said, in the grand scheme of things, my disagreement with
Moore's theory may appear to be a family quarrel.
Nonetheless, I do want to note one basic criticism that I have always
made of moral realist approaches to constitutional theory. John
Rawls argues for the independence of moral and political theory from
deep philosophical questions like those of metaphysics, ontology,
epistemology, and the like.5 Basically, he contends that debates on
these latter questions do not help us resolve questions of moral and
political theory and do not affect the content of principles of justice.
And he argues for a political constructivism as a third way between
conventionalism and moral realism or naturalism.6 Rawls' political
constructivism seeks to construct principles of justice that provide fair
terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust
among free and equal citizens in a morally pluralistic constitutional
democracy such as our own, rather than to discover principles of
justice that are true for all times and places. The latter project is that
of theories of moral realism. By analogy, I have sought to develop a
constitutional constructivism. 7
I would argue that constitutional theory, even more than moral and
political theory, is independent of such deep philosophical questions.
On my view, it is irrelevant for constitutional theory whether
constitutional rights are natural rights or constructivist rights or
indeed conventionalist rights. What matters is the content of the
rights.
3. Moore, supra note 1, at 2089.
4. In the 1980s, I wrote a Ph.D. doctoral dissertation developing a constitutional
constructivism as a third way between legal positivist and natural law theories of
constitutional interpretation. See James E. Fleming, Constitutional Constructivism
(1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Fleming, Constitutional Constructivism].
5. John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, in John Rawls: Collected
Papers 286,286-87 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
6. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 90-99 (1993) [hereinafter Rawls, Political
Liberalism] (distinguishing his project of political constructivism from that of theories
of moral realism or natural law); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 263 (1971)
(characterizing his theory as attempting to find an "Archimedean point" outside
existing circumstances that does not "appeal to a priori or perfectionist principles").
7. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L.
Rev. 211, 217 (1993) [hereinafter Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution];
Fleming, Constitutional Constructivism, supra note 4.
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This argument is relevant to Moore's paper in the following sense.
He advances what he calls "the rights-based justification for judicial
review, ' a label that might seem to be agnostic on the question of
whether rights are natural rights. But then he summarizes the
argument as follows: "judges' regarding a written constitution as
authoritative (so that they use it to overturn ordinary legislation) is
justified by the likelihood that such judges will give greater protection
of natural rights than would the legislature."9  He proceeds to
compare the characteristics of rights, on the one hand, with those of
courts and legislatures, on the other, arguing that "courts generally
will protect natural rights better than do legislatures if one rather than
the other is given the last word on what those rights are or when they
are violated."1 It seems to me that, whatever the merits of his
argument, they are independent of the status of the rights in question
as natural rights. That is, Moore's arguments, to the extent they are
successful, would apply even if he did not claim that constitutional
rights are natural rights-even if he were agnostic on the question of
whether rights are natural or constructivist or even conventionalist.
I. MOORE'S RIGHTS-BASED ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Strikingly, Moore characterizes his rights-based argument for
judicial review enforcing natural rights as "a consequentialist
argument."'" The argument "builds on the good consequences
thought to follow" from it, namely, "the enhanced protection of
natural rights caused by judges exercising the power of judicial
review."12 He concedes that the argument "crucially depends on
constitutions having a certain content," specifically, "a bill of rights
(and one whose clauses refer to a relatively complete list of basic
human rights).' 3
Because Moore frames his argument as a consequentialist
argument, he would seem to invite testing of the argument on the
basis of the real world consequences of judicial review, and thus an
inquiry into whether courts in fact are more effective at protecting
natural rights than are legislatures. For example, he might need to
engage with arguments like those which Mark Tushnet made in his
recent book, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts."4 Tushnet
offers powerful arguments against judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation, and provides an assessment of judicial review-
specifically in terms of how well it has protected the natural rights
8. Moore, supra note 1, at 2099.
9. Id.
10. Id at 2102.
11. Id. at 2100.
12. Id. at 2100-01.
13. Id. at 2101
14. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999).
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proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and how well it has
furthered the moral purposes stated in the Preamble-that should
sober even the most committed, court-loving constitutionalists,
including moral realists.15 He argues that the Constitution should be
treated as self-enforcing through the political processes rather than
judicial review.16 Indeed, as I have stated in a review: "one measure
of the success of Tushnet's book is that I-an unabashed Dworkinian
and a propounder of what might appear to be one of the grandest
court-centered constitutional theories of them all-am persuaded by
his arguments... to the extent that I am.""
To take another example, Moore might have to engage with Jeremy
Waldron's "rights-based critique of constitutional rights" and of
judicial review enforcing them." He might have to, as he puts it, "take
a position on the content of natural rights in order to ascertain how
well the United States Supreme Court has done in protecting them."1 9
Unfortunately, Moore does not address such arguments. Instead, he
tries to deflect them by arguing that they are better addressed to a
parochial version of the rights-based argument for judicial review
based on the American experience, whereas he is making a
universalist version of the argument. The parochial version "make[s]
an empirical observation: judicial review in America, particularly as
exercised by the United States Supreme Court, has on the whole been
a good thing because natural rights have been protected. '20  The
universal version analyzes "more universal features that explain why
we should, in general, expect greater protection of natural rights from
courts applying a written constitution with a bill of rights than we
would expect from legislatures with or without such a constitution in
front of them."'" By his own admission, "the aim of the universalist
version of the argument, however, is to sidestep" objections like
Waldron's2 2 (and, I might add, Tushnet's). He continues: "The
question I ask is this: whatever the content there may be to natural
rights, might courts better protect them than democratic
legislatures?"'
And so, Moore puts his argument in the following strange posture.
He says that his argument is a "content-dependent, consequentialist
15. See id. at 129-53.
16. Id. at 165-72.
17. James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 Cornell L. Rev.
215, 218 (2000) [hereinafter Fleming The Constitution Outside the Courts] (reviewing
Tushnet, supra note 14) (footnote omitted).
18. Moore, supra note 1, at 2103 (referring to Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based
Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 18 (1993)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2101.
21. Id. at 2102.
22. Id. at 2103.
23. Id.
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argument. '24 But he also says (1) that his argument is independent of
the content of natural rights, and (2) that he need not defend his
argument on the basis of assessments of its real world consequences -
Granted, one can distinguish between a parochial version and a
universalist version of the consequentialist argument. But it seems
that ultimately, even the universalist argument needs to be assessed in
terms of its real world consequences. At any rate, Moore's argument,
especially because he offers it as a consequentialist argument, would
be more persuasive if he were to defend it in terms of its real world
consequences for the protection of natural rights. Accordingly, it
would be more persuasive if he were to defend his theory against
sobering assessments of the practice of judicial review like that
offered by Tushnet.
II. MOORE'S COMPARISON OF COURTS AND LEGISLATURES IN
THEIR RIGHTS-PROTECTING CAPACITIES
Moore states that "[t]he basic idea of the universalist version of the
argument is to make a three-way comparison between rights, courts,
and legislatures. '  He elaborates: "More exactly, the comparison is
between certain general features we may plausibly suppose natural
rights to possess and certain features distinctive of courts versus those
features distinctive of legislatures."' In a very clear-headed and
elegant fashion, he boils down the comparison into a chart
summarizing "six reasons courts may plausibly be thought better at
the business of natural rights protection than democratic
legislatures."'  I am not going to take issue with his particular
formulations of characteristics of natural rights, courts, and
legislatures. My observations here will be more general and
fundamental.
My first observation concerns the force or power of reason in
human affairs, including constitutional theory. I think it is fair to say
that, among constitutional theorists, moral realists typically have as
much or more confidence in the power and force of reason in human
affairs, including constitutional interpretation, than do almost any
other variety of thinkers. For example, they are not typically afflicted
by skepticism about reason-whether that of post-modernists,
utilitarians, or economists-or by worries about the indeterminacy of
moral and constitutional principles. Consequently, I am surprised that
Moore expects so little of legislatures as far as the capacity for
reasoning and conscientious constitutional interpretation is
concerned. Indeed, he basically cedes legislatures to majoritarians,
24. Id. at 2101.
25. Id. at 2102.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 2104.
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utilitarians, interest group pluralists, and public choice theorists, and
expects little of them with respect to conscientious constitutional
interpretation and the protection of constitutional rights. By contrast,
many other firm believers in the possibility of reasoning-for
example, Rawls," Frank Michelman, 0 Cass Sunstein,31 and myself32 -
advance conceptions of liberal republicanism or deliberative
democracy that expect more of legislatures as far as the capacities for
reasoning are concerned, particularly in protecting rights and
deliberating about constitutional obligations.
Now, I am not suggesting that Moore has to agree with us, or more
generally that he has to be a civic republican, liberal republican, or
deliberative democrat. But is it too much to ask of a moral realist that
he or she bring reason to bear on legislation as well as adjudication?
More precisely, is it too much to ask that Moore reckon with the calls
to take the Constitution seriously outside the courts-as the foregoing
scholars have done or begun to do?
My second observation is that if we aim to "maximize" the
protection of natural rights, as Moore does, 33 we should not ask
whether courts or legislatures are likely to be better at protecting
natural rights. Instead, we should ask how can we pursue the goal of
getting legislatures as well as courts to do a better job of protecting
natural rights? Along these lines, we should address the calls for
taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts, by legislatures,
executives, and citizens generally.' Elsewhere, I have pondered the
question why, despite these repeated calls, has constitutional theory
remained so court-centered?35 I mentioned six reasons, most of which
rested upon law professors' overly laudatory conceptions of the
capacities of courts and overly disparaging conceptions of the
capacities of legislatures. 6 Moore's comparison of the characteristics
of courts and legislatures could have served as Exhibit A in my
analysis. Most of the reasons that I gave for why constitutional theory
has remained so court-centered are reflected in Moore's comparative
29. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in John Rawls: Collected
Papers, supra note 5, at 573, 579-81; Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 4-5,
240, 299.
30. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988),
31. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993).
32. See Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, supra note 7, at 252-55,
292-96.
33. Moore, supra note 1, at 2115-17.
34. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 31, at 9-10; Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212
(1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure]; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:
Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993)
[hereinafter Sager, Thinness].
35. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, supra note 17, at 225-28.
36. Id.
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argument for why courts are likely to be better than legislatures at
protecting natural rights.
Again, Tushnet has provided a sobering assessment of courts as
vindicators of rights and a sanguine assessment of the capacities of
legislatures both as conscientious interpreters of the Constitution and
as vindicators of rights. 7 We should bear Tushnet's assessment in
mind in considering Moore's arguments. Ultimately, I don't accept
Tushnet's arguments for "taking the Constitution away from courts."
But I believe that his work helps establish the groundwork for taking
the Constitution seriously outside the courts by taking it to
legislatures, executives, and citizens generally, in order that these
bodies might better frame and guide their reflections, deliberations,
and decisions by constitutional principles, aspirations, and ends. ',
Obviously, much work remains to be done in developing-to use Paul
Brest's formulation-"a conscientious legislator's guide to
constitutional interpretation."39 Such a guide need not be utopian.
We could build upon the work of Tushnet, Sanford Levinson '
Lawrence Sager,4 1 and Mary Becker, 2 as well as that of several other
scholars I might mention: Louis Fisher & Neal Devins,4 Wayne
Moore,' Keith Whittington, 4 and Jeremy Waldron. ' The work of all
of these scholars taken together suggests that Congress' practice of
engaging in conscientious constitutional interpretation-and
protecting constitutional rights-has not been as dismal compared
with that of courts as most law professors, including Moore, evidently
assume.
37. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 14-26.57-65,95-128.
3A See Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, supra note 17, at 217, 246-
49.
39. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585, 585 (1975).
40. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988).
41. Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69 Fordham L
Rev. 1989 (2001); Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 34; Sager, Thinness, supra note 34.
42. Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 975 (1993); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's
Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453
(1992); Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution,
69 Fordham L. Rev. 2007 (2001).
43. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political
Process (1988); Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law
(2d ed. 1996); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63
N.C. L. Rev. 707 (1985).
44. Wayne D. Moore, Constitutional Rights and Powers of the People (1996).
45. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and
Constitutional Meaning (1999).
46. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (1999).
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III. MOORE'S MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION
In our prior Fordham conference on "Fidelity in Constitutional
Theory," Ronald Dworkin defended his conception of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation, which entails what he calls a "moral
reading of the Constitution."47 In general, a moral reading of the
Constitution conceives the Constitution as embodying abstract moral
principles, and conceives interpretation and application of those
principles as requiring fresh judgments of political theory about how
they are best understood. Moore's moral realist theory is a form of
moral reading of the Constitution: it conceives the Constitution as
including natural rights, and it conceives constitutional language such
as "equal protection" to refer to natural rights.4
I think it would be illuminating to compare Moore's moral reading
with Dworkin's. Here I will merely note one important difference and
one important similarity between their views. First, the difference.
Dworkin, like Moore, argues for judicial review enforcing a moral
reading of the Constitution on the basis of a content-dependent
reason: the goodness of the consequences thought to follow from it,
namely, the protection of fundamental rights. 9 But Dworkin, unlike
Moore, also advances a content-independent reason: namely, that the
quest for fidelity in constitutional interpretation- the quest for the
interpretation that best fits and justifies the Constitution-requires
it.50 At any rate, in his paper, Moore eschews making any such
argument."
This is a significant omission, for it weakens the appeal of his
argument for judicial review enforcing his moral reading of the
Constitution. Moore seems at a disadvantage as compared with
Dworkin in that Moore can argue only from the good consequences
that follow from his theory, whereas Dworkin can also argue that his
account better fits and justifies our constitutional text, history, and
structure, to say nothing of our tradition, practice, and culture. At the
Fidelity conference, Dworkin was bemused by the fact that several
participants thought that his moral reading was too constrained by
47. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe,
and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249, 1251-56 (1997); see also Ronald Dworkin,
Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1996) [hereinafter
Dworkin, Freedom's Law].
48. Moore, supra note 1, at 2092. In his paper for the conference, Moore does not
indicate whether he believes that aspects of moral reality in addition to natural rights
(for example, aspirations to a good society besides natural rights) are incorporated in
the Constitution and, if so, whether they are judicially enforceable.
49. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 47, at 34-35.
50. Id. at 10-12.
51. Moore, supra note 1, at 2093-98.
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concerns for fit with the Constitution: those critics would like to have
seen him defend an aspirational Constitution with more normative
kick to it!52 At the same time, other participants thought that his
theory was not constrained enough by concerns for fit.51 In retrospect,
I wish Moore had been there to present a defense of his moral reading
of the Constitution. For one thing, his doing so would have shown, in
bold relief, how constrained by fit Dworkin's theory is (at least in
theory).54 For another, to those critics who objected that his theory
was not constrained enough by fit, Dworkin could have retorted,
"You've got the wrong theorist; your criticisms are more aptly aimed
at Moore."
Now, the similarity between Moore's theory and Dworkin's.
Moore's theory, like Dworkin's, fails sufficiently to account for what
Larry Sager has called the evident "thinness" or "moral shortfall" of
constitutional law, as compared with our thicker commitments to
political justice (and, in Moore's case, to natural rights)." To account
for this thinness or moral shortfall, Sager advances a well-known view
that certain constitutional principles required by political justice are
judicially underenforced, yet nonetheless may impose affirmative
obligations outside the courts on legislatures, executives, and citizens
generally to realize them more fully.56 Sager's view is an important
component of a full moral reading or justice-seeking account of the
Constitution. It helps to make sense of the evident thinness or moral
shortfall of constitutional law, while still offering a moral reading or
justice-seeking account. It also has the attractive implication that
when judicially enforceable constitutional rights are not in play,
legislatures and executives still may be under constitutional
obligations to take rights seriously and indeed affirmatively to protect
them, rather than being free to act in constitutionally gratuitous ways.
In my paper for the prior conference, I credited Dworkin with at
least making a nod in the direction of endorsing Sager's powerful and
52 See Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1357, 1357 (1997)
[hereinafter Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity] (quoting Ronald Dworkin's reply to
criticism that he was too "wedded to text," advanced by Robin West, Integrity and
Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law, 65 Fordham L Rev.
1313 (1997)).
53. Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity, supra note 52, at 1360-63 (quoting Dworkin's
reply to criticism that he was "not sufficiently wedded to text," put forward by
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment
on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1269
(1997)).
54. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L Rev.
1335, 1349 (1997) [hereinafter Fleming, Imperfect Constitution] (distinguishing
between Dworkin's theory of fidelity as integrity with the moral reading (which in
theory is sufficiently constrained by concern for fit with legal materials) and
Dworkin's own application of it (for he fails satisfactorily to do the fit work that his
own theory calls for), and urging "[d]o as Dworkin says, not as he does").
55. See Sager, Thinness, supra note 34, at 410, 414-19.
56. Id. at 433-35; Sager, Fair Measure, supra note 34, at 1221, 1263-64.
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important idea.57 I see nothing of the sort in Moore's paper. The
consequences of this omission are twofold. First, Moore's moral
realist theory fails to account for the evident thinness or moral
shortfall of constitutional law (and indeed of the Constitution) vis-a-
vis natural rights. Second, his theory is too easy on legislatures in the
sense that it evidently fails to impose on them direct obligations to
take rights-and moral reality-seriously and to view themselves as
being bound directly by them. Moore might well say his theory is not
incompatible with such an approach. If so, well and good, he should
articulate this idea, especially in a conference where this panel follows
a panel on "The Constitution Outside the Courts and the Pursuit of a
Good Society."
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTAINMENT
In his recent Storrs Lectures, Frank Michelman ponders the
phenomenon that he calls constitutional containment, whereby in
recent years many constitutional theorists have thinned down their
conceptions of the content of the Constitution vis-a-vis the
commitments to justice, natural rights, or the like. Many theorists
who have engaged in this development have done so because of a
belief that the Constitution does or should leave many matters of
justice open for deliberation through the political processes; or, in
terms of this conference, a belief that the Constitution does or should
leave greater room for the pursuit of the good society outside
constitutional law and also outside the courts.
Michelman suggests that there are very few constitutional
expansionists around these days.59 Moore may not qualify as a
constitutional expansionist (if to do so one must be expanding one's
own conception of the moral reach of the Constitution), but he
certainly appears to be holding the line against constitutional
containment. Again, he demonstrates no concern with the moral
shortfall of constitutional rights as compared with natural rights. And
he shows no evident concern to leave matters of justice more open to
democratic deliberation.
My own view concerning this phenomenon of constitutional
containment-which accords with Larry Sager's view-is that we
should thin down constitutional law, or the judicially enforceable
Constitution, in order to bulk up the Constitution outside the courts."
57. Fleming, Imperfect Constitution, supra note 54, at 1343.
58. Frank I. Michelman, The Essential Constitution, The Storrs Lectures at Yale
Law School (Spring 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Michelman, The Storrs
Lectures]; Frank I. Michelman, Populist Natural Law (Reflections on Tushnet's "Thin
Constitution"), 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 461,462-64 (2000).
59. Michelman, The Storrs Lectures, supra note 58.
60. On this point, I have benefited from conversations with Frank Michelman and
Larry Sager.
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To explain: Sager and I propose to thin down constitutional law in the
sense of the judicially enforceable Constitution. But we do so in order
to make clear that the Constitution is richer, fuller, or thicker than the
judicially enforceable Constitution. The point is not to argue that
legislatures should be free to engage in democratic deliberation
without constraint of constitutional obligations. Rather, the point is
to argue that such democratic deliberation is constrained by
constitutional norms, including constitutional obligations to protect
and realize constitutional rights more fully than courts do. Again, we
argue for thinning down the judicially enforceable Constitution in
order to bulk up the Constitution outside the courts.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL ASPIRATIONS AND THE PURSUIT
OF HAPPY ENDINGS
On a panel on constitutional aspirations that includes Sandy
Levinson, I cannot resist the temptation to conclude by making some
remarks about the presence of imperfections in the Constitution and
the pursuit of what he has called "happy endings" in constitutional
interpretation.61 Some scholars have expressed skepticism about
constitutional theories like mine (as well as Dworkin's and Moore's)
on the ground that they seem always to lead to happy endings: that
the Constitution, properly interpreted, requires the result that their
moral or political theories recommend.' I resist the peculiar trend in
recent constitutional theory to prove my positivist mettle by making a
virtue of all the constitutional imperfections, tragedies and stupidities,
and unhappy endings that my theory sanctions." Put another way, I
question the wisdom of submitting constitutional theories to an
"imperfect Constitution" test, or what Christopher Eisgruber has
dubbed a "no pain, no claim" test.' Basically, the idea is that a
constitutional theory has no serious claim on our attention unless the
theorist putting it forward suffers some pain by acknowledging that
the Constitution does not secure everything that she or he would
protect in a perfect Constitution. Our Constitution is indeed
61. I believe that the term "happy endings" comes from Sandy Levinson. See
Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity, supra note 52, at 1358 (question from Professor
Levinson). For application of the term, see Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 47,
at 38; James E. Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy in Dying: Or lVhose Tragedy Is It,
Anyway?, in Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 162, 163, 166-67
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) [hereinafter Fleming,
Constitutional Tragedy]. In this section, I draw upon my analysis in the work just
cited.
62- See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L Rev. 353, 353-
60 (1981).
63. See Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy, supra note 61, at 167.
64. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Tet: Rethinking the
Constitutional Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 Duke L.J. 1, 7 (1993).
2129
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
imperfect in many ways.65 But we should strive to interpret it so as to
mitigate its imperfections and to avoid interpretive tragedies or
stupidities. We should aspire to interpret the Constitution so as to
make it the best it can be.' That is, we should embrace what I have
called a Constitution-perfecting theory of interpretation,67 which
proudly aims at happy endings rather than reveling in the
Constitution's imperfections or in the tragedies or stupidities that it
might be interpreted to permit. Instead of submitting constitutional
theories to a "no pain, no claim" test, I argue, we should challenge
them with what Eisgruber has called a "no gain, no claim" test.s
From this standpoint, a constitutional theory has no serious claim on
our attention unless it promises some gain, in the sense that adhering
to it might exhort us to pursue and realize our highest and noblest
constitutional aspirations. That test, I submit, my Constitution-
perfecting theory (along with Dworkin's moral reading and Moore's
moral realist theory) satisfies in full measure.
65. See Fleming, Constitutional Tragedy, supra note 61, at 162.
66. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 365-68 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, A
Matter of Principle 146-66 (1985).
67. For the idea of a "Constitution-perfecting" theory, as distinguished from a
"process-perfecting" theory, see Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution,
supra note 7, at 214-15. I mean "perfecting" in the sense of interpreting the
Constitution with integrity so as to render it a coherent whole, not in Monaghan's
caricatured sense of "Our Perfect Constitution" as creating a perfect liberal utopia or
an "ideal object" of political morality. See Monaghan, supra note 62, at 354-60.
68. See Eisgruber, supra note 64, at 13.
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